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Policy gold or wooden spoon? Is there a case for putting
government targets into law?
Emma Norris argues that although legislated policy targets have their many advantages,
of which a focus on longer-term objectives is one, they can also devalue the legislative
process by by placing too few penalties on non-compliance. Here Emma highlights ways in
which they might be more effective.
Team GB’s target of  48 medals at London 2012 was high prof ile, public – and, unlike so
many other policy targets – achieved. Paralympics GB are also on track to meet their
target of  103 medals. But would it have made any dif f erence if  the Blair government had
decided to put the medals targets into law? The Institute f or
Government looked at the recent phenomenon of  legislated
policy targets at a private roundtable with lawyers and policy
advisers and have published a paper on the pros and cons.
Labour had quite a penchant f or legislated targets, introducing
the target to eliminate f uel poverty by 2016; the target to
‘signif icantly reduce’ child poverty by 2020; and the Climate
Change Act which targets an 80% emissions reduction by 2050.
The current government has also committed to enshrining the
0.7% ODA target in law. But despite all this activity, legislated
targets remain a controversial practice. So we asked: are
legislated targets a commitment device, a polit ical gesture or a
constitutional outrage?
All governments legislate – and bind successor governments until
that legislation is repealed. But this category of  legislation
deliberately makes it harder f or subsequent governments to amend or remove the law. This can be due
to specif ic provisions in the legislation (e.g. by including extra consultation or voting requirements to
repeal the law) or more simply by creating a polit ical commitment that f ew governments would want to
publicly reverse (e.g. to reduce child poverty).
Why are governments interested in legislated targets? For Labour, the growth of  legislated targets in
recent years could be seen as part of  a wider move to entrench elements of  the welf are state and the
post-war settlement including creating individual rights to services. More broadly, targets can also help
make government more strategic – helping it to f ocus on long term goals and signalling the priority
government attaches to an issue both internally and externally. The Climate Change Act is a case in point.
It helped Def ra and DECC get buy- in f rom other departments, f ocused Ministerial attention, showed
international leadership in the run-up to Copenhagen and gave certainty to businesses considering long-
term green investments that action on emissions reduction was going to happen.
But opponents of  this f orm of  legislation argue that targets can be dangerous. Governments can use
legislated targets to give the impression of  decisive action (e.g. ending child poverty) without having to
discuss or commit themselves to any specif ic measures needed to achieve the goal. If  such targets are
then missed, it is unclear what legal redress there really is. A judge might declare a f ailure to meet the
2020 child poverty target unlawf ul which is undoubtedly polit ically embarrassing, but is also without clear
legal consequences. It is highly unlikely the courts would ever mandate government to f ulf il a target given
their reluctance to get involved with the allocation of  public money or to upset the ‘constitutional
settlement’ between the executive and the judiciary. Indeed, the unclear legal consequences of  missing
legislated targets are highlighted in the draf t (never enacted) Of f icial Development Assistance Bill of
2010 which included an “ouster clause” stating that there would be no legal consequences f or missing
the target.
There are also more polit ical concerns about the development of  legislated targets. For instance, they
could be used as an alternative to trying to entrench policies through winning the polit ical argument and
establishing a new polit ical consensus through actions rather than legislation. It is also possible
legislated policy targets could be used to pre-empt manif estos and narrow the area of  debate at election
time. This would place a particular burden on oppositions in the run-up to elections, who would need to
have the courage to oppose when they realised that a trap was being set f or them, rather than take the
path of  least resistance.
Given the risks of  prolif eration of  targets with f ew penalties f or non-compliance devaluing the legislative
process, our paper suggests that:
Targets should f ocus on high level outcomes; the best laws are those which enunciate general
principles and f ocus on real problems (e.g. reducing emissions) without being too prescriptive
about how to get there;
Targets should be used sparingly and should have some built- in capacity f or adaptation in the
light of  new circumstances;
Independent oversight institutions (e.g. the Committee on Climate Change) are of ten more
ef f ective than the targets themselves at ensuring outcomes are met, f or instance by ensuring
targets are resilient to popular opinion
The precise measures chosen f or the target matter should be properly scrutinised with the
implications of  the measures needed to meet them properly understood;
Any use of  targets theref ore needs to be clear about the consequences of  f ailing to meet them.
At their strongest, targets can get government, business and other stakeholders behind crucial
objectives such as reducing emissions and tackling climate change. But they should be seen as a means,
not an end. Setting a target is not a substitute f or putting in place the measures needed to achieve the
objective. It is too easy f or the government to get plaudits f or setting a heroic goal – without having to
come clean on the f easibility and desirability of  doing what it takes to meet it.
One conclusion is that this development had been under-scrutinised – both in Parliament and the wider
policy community and targets with big potential f uture costs were entered into rather casually. Our paper
is intended to start the wider debate we think is necessary.
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